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小さな島々をめぐる大騒ぎ—尖閣・釣魚諸島と中日対立
Gavan McCo rmack
Resume
Mo re than s ix decades  fro m the San Francis co  Treaty that purpo rtedly reso lved the As ia-Pacific War and created a sys tem o f peace,
Eas t As ia in 2013 remains  tro ubled by the ques tio n o f so vereignty o ver a gro up o f tiny, uninhabited is lands . The go vernments  o f
Japan, China, and Taiwan all co vet and claim so vereignty o ver the Senkaku/Diao yu is lands .
These tiny is lands , to gether with o ther s cattered o utcro ppings  acro ss  the Wes tern Pacific, assume to day so me o f the weight that
attached almo s t a century ago  to  the vas t do main o f No rtheas t China (“Manchuria”), with co mparable po tential to  plunge the regio n
into  co nflict. If the co untries  o f the regio n are to  transcend the 19 th and 20th century eras  o f Japanese imperialism and US Co ld
War hegemo ny and co ns truct a 21s t century o f peace, co o peratio n, and pro sperity, the Senkaku/Diao yu is sue mus t so meho w firs t
be addressed.
1. T he Lo ng View
The is lands  kno wn in Japanese as  Senkaku and in Chinese as  Diao yu are little mo re than ro cks  in the o cean, but they are ro cks  o n
which there is  a real pro spect o f peace and co o peratio n in the regio n fo undering. It is  a pro blem that I firs t addressed jus t o ver 40
years  ago , and o n which I have published o ther o ccas io nal essays  mo re recently.2
The Senkaku/Diao yu pro blem calls  to  mind the research o n which I o nce engaged o n the “Manchurian pro blem,” which also  aro se
o ver ho w to  draw a line dividing “o ur” fro m “yo ur” territo ry, a life-line that abso lutely had to  be pro tected. Because the line early 20 th
century Japan then drew was  unacceptable to  China, the dispute o ver it led in due co urse to  the catas tro phe o f war. “Senkaku” is  o f
co urse no t to  be co mpared to  the vas t do mains  that were then at s take in “Manchuria,” but its  impo rtance far o utweighs  its  barren
and unpo pulated ro cks  and fo cuses  s imilarly pass io nate, unco mpro mis ing sentiment.
While eco no mic integratio n in Eas t As ia pro ceeds  by leaps  and bo unds  and po pular culture flo ws  freely, the regio n has  little sense
o f shared his to ry, identity o r directio n and it is  s till framed by the security architecture o f the Co ld War. The diff iculty is  co mpo unded
by the pro cess  o f gradual, but fundamental, shift in the po wer balance that prevailed thro ugho ut the 20 th century. China rises  and
Japan declines , a pheno meno n that may be encapsulated in a s ingle set o f s tatis tics . The Japan that as  pro po rtio n o f glo bal GDP
was  15 per cent in 1990  fell belo w 10  per cent in 2008  and has  been pro jected to  fall to  6  per cent in 2030  and 3.2 per cent in 2060,
while the China that was  2 per cent in 1990  is  predicted to  reach 25 per cent in 2030  and 27.8  per cent in 2060.3 It is  that shift in
relative weight, perhaps  mo re than anything that dis turbs  Japan. Is lands  that in themselves  are trivial co me to  carry heavy symbo lic
weight.
In the lo ng his to rical perspective, it is  po ss ible to  view the pas t millennium in As ia as  a sequence o f mo re-o r-less  hegemo nic
o rders : the Pax Mongolica (1206  to  1368), the Chinese “Tribute” sys tem o r Pax Sinica o f Ming and Qing dynas ties  (1368  to  1911), the
sho rt-lived Pax Nipponica (ro ughly 1931 to  1945), and the s till-co ntinuing Pax Americana (bo rn with US victo ry in the As ia-Pacific War
and enshrined with the San Francis co  Treaty in effect fro m 1952). The las t o f these, ho wever, entering upo n its  seventh decade
sho ws  s igns  o f severe s train, no t leas t because China is  to o  great and to o  tied to  all the majo r US alliance parties  to  be excluded
o r co ntained. Pres ident Obama may yet succeed in renewing and reinfo rcing the fabric o f Pax Americana alliances , and thereby in
maintaining its  military and po litical pre-eminence under the Pacific Tilt do ctrine declared early in 2012, but a very different
po ss ibility is  o ccas io nally to  be glimpsed: a po s t-hegemo nic o rder, a co ncert o f s tates  o r co mmo nwealth, a Pax Asia.
Lo o king to wards  such a future, then Japanese Prime Minis ter Fukuda
Yasuo  agreed with China’s  pres ident Hu Jintao  at their summit meeting in
February 2008  that the Eas t China Sea sho uld be made a “Sea o f Peace,
Co o peratio n and Friendship,”4 and at the bilateral summit in September,
2009, a year and a half later, Hato yama Yukio  pro po sed that it be
trans fo rmed into  a “Sea o f Fraternity” (Yuai no umi),5 to  which Hu is  said
to  have respo nded po s itively. Three mo nths  later, in the heyday o f the
newly elected Demo cratic Party go vernment in Japan, Ozawa Ichiro  led a,
600-s tro ng, semi-o fficial friendship miss io n to  Beijing. That mo ment
was  the high po int o f a mo o d o f empathetic co o peratio n. It po inted to  a
po ss ible way fo rward, o ne in which so vereignty is sues  wo uld be shelved
and the develo pment o f reso urces  reso lved co o peratively (as  indeed
fo reshado wed by several agreements  reached and to  so me extent
implemented during the early 21s t century years ), evo lving gradually into
so me kind o f regio nal co mmunity. The mo o d did no t las t lo ng, ho wever,
and by 2013 it seemed an age away.
2. What  are T hese Islands and What  is T heir Signif icance?
The Senkaku/Diao yu is lands  gro up co mprises  bas ically five uninhabited
is lands , mo re co rrectly is lets  (plus  several even smaller o utcro ps ), kno wn respectively under their Japanese and Chinese names  as
Uo tsuri/Diao yudao , Kita Ko jima/Bei Xiao dao , Minami Ko jima/Nan Xiao dao , Kuba/Huangwei and Taisho /Chiwei. The larges t
(Uo tsuri/Diao yu; literally “Fish-catch” in Japanese, “Catch-fish” in Chinese) is  4.3 square kilo metres  and the to tal area o f all f ive
jus t 6 .3 square kilo metres . The is lands  are spread o ver a wide area o f sea, abo ut 27 kilo metres  separating the co re clus ter o f three
is lands  (Uo tsuri, Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima) fro m Kuba, and abo ut 110  fro m Taisho .6  They are lo cated in relatively shallo w
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.
waters  at the edge o f the Chinese co ntinental shelf, 330  kilo metres  eas t o f the China mainland co as t, 170  kilo metres  no rtheas t o f
Taiwan, and abo ut the same dis tance no rth o f Yo naguni (o r Ishigaki) is lands  in the Okinawa gro up, separated fro m the main
Okinawan is lands  by a deep (maximum 2,940  metres )7 underwater trench kno wn as  the “Okinawa Tro ugh” o r in China as  the “Sino -
Ryukyu Tro ugh.”
Chinese do cuments  fro m the 14th century reco rd and name the is lands  as  impo rtant navigatio nal po ints  o n the maritime ro ute
between co as tal China (Fo o cho w) and the Ryukyu kingdo m capital at Shuri, especially necessary fo r tribute miss io ns  during Ming
and Qing dynas ties . China sent the Ryukyu kingdo m ten such miss io ns  and Ryukyu dispatched 281 to  the Chinese co urt in return
between the 16 th and 19th centuries . Ryukyuan ships  heading farther afield, o n trading miss io ns  to  So utheas t As ia, also  almo s t
certainly used this  same ro ute.8  Ownership, ho wever, did no t greatly co ncern anyo ne. The Euro pean s tate sys tem with its
Wes tphalian no tio ns  o f so vereignty was  an alien co ncept. It appears  that no bo dy actually settled there.
Two  late 19 th century develo pments  wro ught decis ive change. In 1879  the Meiji go vernment fo rcibly extinguished the Ryukyu
kingdo m’s  res idual so vereignty (building upo n the partial subjectio n acco mplished by Satsuma fo llo wing its  invas io n in 1609) and
inco rpo rated the Ryukyus  (as  Okinawa) within the Japanese s tate, unilaterally severing the Ryukyu’s  membership in the Beijing-
centred tribute sys tem and bringing the mo dern, imperialis t s tate sys tem that wo uld replace it clo ser to  Senkaku/Diao yu.
As  China pro tes ted the Japanese s tate’s  encro achments  in the Eas t China Sea, US pres ident Grant played a ro le in attempting to
mediate a Sino -Japanese settlement. What Japan mo s t so ught, ho wever, was  a co mprehens ive revis io n o f the China-Japan Treaty
that o pened relatio ns  between the two  co untries  in 1871. It wanted the same unequal treaty rights  (“mo s t favo ured natio n” s tatus )
in mainland China as  were enjo yed by the es tablished imperialis t po wers . In return it o ffered to  split the Ryukyus: ceding the so uth-
wes tern is lands  o f Miyako  and the Yaeyama’s  to  China. China co untered with a pro po sal fo r a three way split: the no rthern is lands ,
including Amami, to  Meiji Japan, the main is land o f Okinawa to  beco me independent under a res to red Ryukyu/Okinawa king, and the
so uthwes t is lands  ceded to  China.9  Bo th pro po sals  agreed that the Miyako  and Yaeyama is land gro ups , that is  to  say the Okinawan
is lands  clo ses t to  the Senkaku/Diao yu’s , sho uld be China’s . A treaty in line with the Chinese pro po sal was  drawn up early in 1881
but no t actually ado pted because o f o ppo s itio n at high levels  within the Chinese go vernment.10  Then pre-eminent Chinese leader Li
Ho ngjiang is  said to  have o bjected that “Ryukyu is  neither Chinese no r Japanese territo ry, but a so vereign s tate.” 11 When China, o ne
hundred and thirty-two  years  later, pro tes ted that there had never been an agreement between the two  co untries  o n the s tatus  o f
Okinawa, and urging that it be the subject o f dis cuss io ns , Japan and Okinawa itself were sho cked, but it was  s tating a s imple
his to rical fact.12
The unilateral ass imilatio n to  Japan o f Ryukyu as  Okinawa in 1879  in no  way affected the s tatus  o f the tiny Senkaku/Diao yu is lands .
But jus t five years  later, in 1884, a Japanese merchant, Ko ga Tatsushiro , settled o n Senkaku. Initiating a bus iness  in co llecting
albatro ss  feathers  and to rto ise shells , he submitted a claim thro ugh the newly es tablished Okinawa prefecture to  have them
declared Japanese territo ry o n gro unds  o f being unclaimed and uno ccupied.
In o ther wo rds , Ko ga’s  1884 Senkaku applicatio n related to  territo ry that was  o f such little impo rt to  Japan that it had been ready
jus t years  earlier to  cede it (and much mo re) to  China as  part o f a fro ntier grand bargain. The Meiji go vernment in To kyo  delayed a
decis io n o n this  matter fo r a full ten years , fearful o f ro us ing China’s  suspicio ns  at a time when it wo rried that China might enjo y
naval supremacy. That anxiety o nly eased fo llo wing the majo r battles  in which it decis ively defeated Qing China in the Sino -Japanese
War, whereupo n the Japanese cabinet reso lved in January 1895 to  accept the Ko ga pro po sal. Japan annexed two  o f the is lands
(Uo tsuri and Kuba), as  part o f Yaeyama Co unty, Okinawa prefecture. It then (1896) leased fo ur (Uo tsuri, Ko ta Ko jima, Minami
Ko jima, and Kuba) to  Ko ga o n a thirty year, fee-less , bas is , ado pted the name “Senkaku Is lands” (in 1900) as  a trans latio n o f the
name “Pinnacle Ro cks ” fo und o n British naval charts , and in 1926  co nverted the fo ur is land lease to  a freeho ld grant to  the Ko ga
family.13 The fifth is land, Taisho /Chiwei, was  never part o f the Ko ga family do main, but was  s imply claimed by the Go vernment o f
Japan in 1921.
The Japanese annexatio n was  a diplo matic secret, no t published until many years  later in the po s t-war co mpilatio ns  o f Japanese
diplo matic reco rds , and the “markers ” autho rized by the 1895 cabinet reso lutio n were no t actually set up o n the is lands  until May
1969.14
Thro ugh the Japanese empire in Eas t As ia fro m 1895, Ko ga maintained his  bus iness , expanding it to  emplo y perhaps  as  many as  248
peo ple (99  ho useho lds ) by aro und 1910,15 catching, drying, pro cess ing, and canning fish, o nly withdrawing aro und 1940,
abando ning the is lands  under the shado w o f war.
As ia then had much greater ques tio ns  to  wo rry abo ut, and Senkaku was  o f interes t to  no  o ne. In the immediate po s t-war years
Japan’s  Fo reign Minis try made o nly brief reference to  them, dismiss ing them as  “uninhabited and o f little impo rtance.”16  China
(Beijing)’s  Fo reign Minis try seems  also  to  have had no  interes t in them. In a draft paper prepared in 1950, so o n after the Chinese
Co mmunis t party came to  po wer, it referred s imply to  the is lands  by their Japanese name as  “part o f Okinawa.” 17 So me do ubt mus t
remain o n the s tatus  o f this  pro po sal until the actual do cument is  published, but had it been implemented, and had Beijing actually
been invited to  San Francis co , such a s tance might at leas t have info rmed the co mprehens ive dis cuss io ns  o n territo ry that wo uld
have fo llo wed.
The ques tio n o f Okinawa itself, raised by China in 2013 as  s till pro blematic and needing to  be addressed in so me arrangement
between the two  co untries , was  also  seen as  mo o t by US Pres ident Franklin Ro o sevelt. In 1943, he co ns idered China’s  claim to  the
Okinawan is lands  as  a who le so  s tro ng that he twice asked Chinese pres ident Chiang Kai-shek whether he wo uld like to  take
po ssess io n o f them in the eventual po s t-war settlement.18  Chiang, in a decis io n he is  said to  have later deeply regretted, declined.
In adminis tering the Ryukyus  fro m 1951 to  72, the US also  assumed co ntro l o f seas  that included the Senkakus .19  Ho wever, in the
nego tiatio ns  o ver Okinawan revers io n (1969-1972) it drew a line between the different secto rs , trans ferring to  Japan so vereignty
o ver Ryukyu but o nly adminis trative co ntro l o ver Senkaku. So vereignty was  left unreso lved, in implicit admiss io n that the is lands
might be subject to  co mpeting claims . The United States  has  held s trictly to  that po s itio n to  this  day.
Why then, did the US split Senkaku fro m Ryukyu in 1972? Hara Kimie, To yo shita Narahiko , and o thers , attribute the decis io n to
Machiavellian US des ign. They believe it was  explicit and deliberate. Acco rding to  Hara, the US unders to o d that the is lands  wo uld
functio n as  a “wedge o f co ntainment” o f China and that a “territo rial dispute between Japan and China, especially o ver is lands  near
Okinawa, wo uld render the US military presence in Okinawa mo re acceptable to  Japan.”20  Acco rding to  To yo shita, the US to o k a
deliberately “vague” (aimai) attitude o ver territo rial bo undaries ,21 so wing the seeds  o r sparks  (hidane) o f territo rial co nflict between
China and Japan, and thereby ensuring Japan’s  lo ng-term dependence o n the US and jus tifying the US base presence.22 Fo r bo th, the
implicatio n is  clear: the Senkaku/Diao yu pro blem o f to day is  the co nsequence o f a US po licy decis io n. Tho ugh co nscio us  intent is
necessarily diff icult to  pro ve, their hypo thes is  certainly o ffers  a plaus ible explanatio n fo r the US shift o f po s itio n.
The vague and unreso lved “wedge/spark” fo rmula o f Senkaku/Diao yu o wnership, by ensuring o ngo ing frictio n in the Japan-China
relatio nship also  served as  o ne o f a set o f keys  lo cking Japan in place as  a client o r US-dependent s tate.23
The Senkaku/Diao yu “pro blem” as  it came to  be kno wn aro se in the co ntext o f s imultaneo us  develo pments  at this  time: the US shift
o f its  po s itio n (marked mo s t dramatically by the Nixo n-led rappro chement with China), the sudden realizatio n o n all s ides , fo llo wing
an ECAFE repo rt o n its  1968  inves tigatio n, that is land o wnership rights  might carry po tentially valuable reso urce rights  to  a secto r
o f the Eas t China Sea believed to  be “the las t remaining, riches t, as  yet unexplo ited depo s ito ry o f o il and natural gas ,” the lo dging
o f claims  to  the Senkaku/Diao yu gro up by bo th Japan o n the o ne hand and ROC and PRC o n the o ther; and the s tirring o f a
s ignificant internatio nal o verseas  Chinese mo vement to  suppo rt the Chinese demand.24
 
3. T he Shelf , 19 72-20 10
Subsequently, Japan and China paid attentio n to  Senkaku/Diao yu o n two  key o ccas io ns , in 1972 and 1978. When Japanese Prime
Minis ter Tanaka Kakuei raised the ques tio n to  Chinese premier Zho u Enlai o n the fo rmer o ccas io n, Zho u replied that the matter
sho uld be shelved as  o pening it wo uld co mplicate and delay the no rmalizatio n pro cess .25 Six years  later, in Japan to  nego tiate a
Peace and Friendship Treaty, Deng Xiao ping reiterated this  “shelving” fo rmula, preferring to  leave it to  “the next generatio n” to  find
sufficient wisdo m to  reso lve it.26  Fo r ro ughly 40  years  a modus vivendi held: tho ugh o ccas io nal landings  (by Chinese activis ts  fro m a
Ho ng Ko ng base and by Japanese rightis ts  sailing fro m po rts  in Okinawa) to o k place, the two  go vernments  tacitly co o perated to
prevent them.27
To day, the Japanese Fo reign Minis try ado pts  the impro bable po s itio n that there was  no  such “shelving” arrangement. 28  While it
seems  clear there was  no  fo rmal diplo matic do cument to  such effect, ho wever, the exchanges  reco rded abo ve were no t trivial. What
seems  likely is  that bo th s ides  s tated their respective po s itio ns  but cho se to  avo id fo rmal nego tiatio ns  which might have delayed
general settlement.29
One pro minent Japanese scho lar no w accuses  the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs  o f “inexcusable and o utrageo us” behavio ur in having
altered the Minutes  o f the Tanaka-Zho u meeting o f 1972 and “burned and des tro yed” tho se o f the So no da-Deng meeting o f 1978
les t either yield evidence prejudicial to  the o fficial case o f undisputed Japanese so vereignty.30  In light o f the recent revelatio n o f the
trashing o f a vas t cache o f Fo reign Minis try materials  o n the eve o f Freedo m o f Info rmatio n rules  being intro duced in 2001, Yabuki’s
allegatio n canno t s imply be dismissed.31
In two  decis ive s teps , ho wever, in 2010  and 2012, Japan mo ved to  ensure that the shelf never be put back.32 In 2010, the Demo cratic
Party o f Japan’s  go vernment arres ted the Chinese captain o f a fishing ship in waters  o ff Senkaku, ins is ting that there was  “no  ro o m
fo r do ubt” that the is lands  were an integral part o f Japanese territo ry, that there was  no  territo rial dispute o r diplo matic is sue, and
the Chinese vessel was  s imply in breach o f Japanese law (interfering with o fficials  co nducting their duties ). The fierce Chinese
respo nse caused Japan to  back do wn and release the captain witho ut press ing charges ,33 but Japanese reso lve hardened and China
appears  to  have co ncluded that Japan had determined to  set as ide the “shelving” agreement. Mutual antago nism deepened s teadily
thereafter.
Fro m China’s  viewpo int, it was  s triking that Japan co ncentrated its  diplo matic effo rt no t o n reso lving a bilateral dispute o ver bo rders
but o n widening it to  a security matter invo lving the United States , attaching its  highes t prio rity to  securing an assurance fro m the
US go vernment that the is lands  were subject to  Article 5 o f the US-Japan Security Treaty, the clause that autho rizes  the US to
pro tect Japan in the case o f an armed attack “in territo ries  under the adminis tratio n o f Japan.” U.S. Secretary o f State Hillary Clinto n
accepted that po s itio n in Octo ber 2010,34 and in due co urse, under s tro ng Japanese pro mpting, it was  entered into  the Natio nal
Defense Autho rizatio n Act fo r FY 2013 and appro ved by the Senate o n 29  No vember 2012.35
That is  to  say the US co ntinued to  ackno wledge the “adminis tratio n o f Japan o ver the Senkaku Is lands” but to o k no  po s itio n o n the
ques tio n o f so vereignty.36  Altho ugh much was  made o f this , there was  “no thing new” in it.37 It means  that, while the United States
had no  view o n which co untry sho uld o wn the is lands , o r even what they sho uld be called, it was  ready to  go  to  war to  defend Japan’s
claim to  them. It is  a po s itio n that Henry Kis s inger (in April 1971) described as  “no nsense.”38
As  the co nfro ntatio n intens ified, the left-right po litical divide in Japan dis so lved into  an “all Japan” fro nt, with a bro ad natio nal
co nsensus  suppo rting the Japanese o fficial s to ry o f its  Senkaku rights , pro tes ting China’s  threat to  Japan’s  so vereign territo ry and
ins is ting there was  no  dispute and that the security alliance with the US co vered defence o f the is lands  agains t any China challenge.
If September 2010  marked “shelf do wn,” in April 2012 it was  as  if the shelf suppo rts  were remo ved to o . To kyo  Go verno r Ishihara
Shintaro  anno unced to  a co nservative American think-tank audience in Washingto n, D.C. that his  city was  nego tiating to  buy the
three privately o wned is lets  o f Uo tsuri, Kita Ko jima and Minami Ko jima,39  in o rder, he said, to  clarify public, Japanese go vernmental
jurisdictio n and remo ve any po ss ible challenge to  their so vereignty by China o r Taiwan. His  anno uncement – co upled with his
calculated abuse o f China (o r “Shina,” the insulting, wartime appellatio n Ishihara deliberately cho se to  emplo y) - s tirred a diplo matic
s to rm.
Ishihara’s  To kyo  Metro po litan Go vernment began dis tributing a po s ter featuring a pho to graph o f the three is lets  that it was
co ncerned with and the message calling fo r the “co urage” to  say, “Japan’s  is lands  are Japan’s  territo ry.” 40  It also  published an
advertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking fo r US suppo rt fo r its  is land purchas ing plan, po intedly no ting that the is lands  were
“o f indispensable geo s trategic impo rtance to  US fo rce pro jectio n,”41 leaving no  ro o m fo r do ubt as  to  the directio n in which the
United States  sho uld pro ject its  fo rce.
The summer o f 2012 in Eas t As ia was  ho t. Rival gro ups  o f activis ts  challenged each o ther with acts  o f bravado . Vessels  under
vario us  flags  and representing vario us  claims  o ver the is lands  made o r attempted to  make vis its , ratcheting up tens io n.
On 7 July, 75 th anniversary o f Japan’s  launch o f all-o ut war o n China, Prime Minis ter No da ado pted the Ishihara cause and declared
the natio nal go vernment wo uld buy and “natio nalize” the is lands . 42 Later that same mo nth he declared his  readiness  to  deplo y the
Self-Defence Fo rces  to  defend them, 43 and in September he fo rmally purchased them (fo r 20 .5 billio n yen, o r ca. $26  millio n) and
“natio nalized” them, 44 declaring to  the UN General Assembly that the is lands  were “intrins ic Japanese territo ry,” o ver which there
was  no  dispute and co uld be no  nego tiatio n.45
Pro tes t demo ns tratio ns  fo llo wed in Ho ng Ko ng and cities  and to wns  acro ss  China – cars  were o verturned, Japanese res taurant
windo ws  smashed, Japanese go o ds  trashed, and exchanges  o f to ur gro ups , s tudents , and bus inesses  suspended.
 
4 . Abe - “T aking Back”
Abe Shinzo  campaigned fo r the December 2012 lo wer ho use electio n under the o verall s lo gan o f “taking back the co untry.” He
pledged no t to  yield o ne millimetre o f Japan’s  “inherent” territo ry o f Senkaku,46  a matter o n which there was  no  dispute, no  ro o m
fo r dis cuss io n o r nego tiatio n. He wro te:
“What is  called fo r in the Senkaku vicinity is  no t nego tiatio n but phys ical fo rce incapable o f being misunders to o d.”47
Abe’s  clo se friend, educatio n minis ter Shimo mura Hakubun, was  equally fo rthright. He referred to  Senkaku as  having been “s to len
away” (an o dd fo rmulatio n when effective co ntro l was  plainly in Japan’s  hands).
“Right no w,” he went o n, “Japan is  no t functio ning as  a natio n. … The 67 years  s ince the end o f Wo rld War ll have been a his to ry o f
Japan’s  des tructio n. No w is  o ur o nly chance to  remake the co untry.”48
Shimo mura, and presumably the Abe go vernment, evidently believed that to  s tand up to  and refuse to  nego tiate with China was  to
“remake” Japan. When fo rmer Prime Minis ter Hato yama Yukio  challenged the go vernment (while o n a vis it to  Beijing), saying,
“But if yo u lo o k at his to ry, there is  a dispute … If yo u keep saying, ‘There is  no  territo rial dispute,’ yo u will never get an answer;”49
Abe’s  Defense Minis ter, Ono dera Itsuno ri, branded him a traito r (kokuzoku).50
The intrans igent language o f Japanese go vernments  in 2013 was  reminis cent o f
1937, when Japan’s  then leader, Ko no e Fumimaro  ruled o ut nego tiatio ns  with
Chin’s  Chiang Kai-shek in the fateful mo nths  leading to  full-s cale war with China,
and when the natio nal media was  s imilarly self-righteo us  and dismiss ive o f China’s
“unreaso nableness ” and “pro vo catio n.” 51 To  China it lo o ked as  tho ugh Japan was
actively co llabo rating in co ns tructio n o f a militarized Maritime Great Wall o f China
to  blo ck its  access  to  the Pacific Ocean. In April D iao yu was  fo r the firs t time
declared a “co re interes t,” and in May the People’s Daily added that the s tatus  o f
Okinawa itself had to  be nego tiated.
Ho wever, the high-risk asso ciated with the po licies  and initiatives  declared by the
new Abe go vernment evidently alarmed Washingto n. When US Secretary o f State
Hillary Clinto n to ld Fo reign Minis ter Kishida Fumio  at their meeting in Washingto n
in January 2013 that there was  indeed a dispute and that Japan sho uld s it do wn
with China to  nego tiate it,52 it was  in effect a rebuke. Altho ugh Abe subsequently
mo derated his  language and po licy, when he vis ited Washingto n in late February
2013, he was  given neither dinner no r even a jo int press  co nference, having to
satis fy himself with a perfuncto ry lunch with the pres ident. Furthermo re, the Jo int
Co mmunique made no  reference to  what he mo s t so ught: US backing fo r the
Japanese claim to  so vereignty o ver Senkaku/Diao yu.53 Ins tead it was  devo ted
entirely to  a s ingle is sue, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, o r TPP, Washingto n’s
primary agenda. By ins is ting that he “wo uld no t act rashly” o ver the dispute, Abe
appeared to  be s triving to  dampen fears  that that was  precisely ho w the White
Ho use suspected he might act.54 There was  a plaintive no te to  the press
co nference at which he s to o d alo ne to  declare the alliance s trengthened. He was
mo re at ease in fro nt o f the “Japan handlers ” at the Center fo r Security and
internatio nal Studies  (CSIS) later that day declaring that “Japan is  back,”55 by
which he was  unders to o d to  mean that its  o bedience to  Washingto n directives  o n
the co ns tructio n o f the new base at Heno ko  o n Okinawa was  unques tio ned, the
TPP accepted and base reo rganizatio n his  greates t prio rity. Co ncern that Abe’s
neo -natio nalis t and his to rical revis io nis t (rejecting “the narrative o f imperial Japanese aggress io n and victimizatio n o f o ther
As ians ”) agenda might be “divis ive” and “co uld hurt U.S. interes ts ” spread in Washingto n (and thro ugho ut the US media).56
5. Int rinsic Nat io nal T errit o ry  
The Japanese Senkaku claim res ts  o n three fundamental assertio ns : that the is lands , tho ugh annexed in 1895 jus t after China’s
defeat in war and three mo nths  prio r to  the Treaty o f Shimo no seki by which Taiwan and o ther is lands  were specifically ceded to
Japan, were no t “war spo ils ,” (o r “s to len territo ries ” in the wo rds  o f the 1943 Cairo  Agreement) but terra nullius, territo ry un-o wned
and unclaimed by any o ther co untry; that the Japanese o ccupatio n had been unchallenged between the act o f annexatio n in 1895 and
the publicatio n o f the ECAFE repo rt in 1968, fo r at leas t 70  years ; and that the is lands  were in so me almo s t metaphys ical sense
Japan’s  intrins ic, inalienable territo ry, what it called koyu no ryodo, a fundamental secto r o f the Ryukyu Is lands . What fo r o ne purpo se
was  abando ned and un-o wned beco mes  fo r ano ther Japan’s  abso lute and inalienable territo ry.
As  to  the firs t claim, based o n terra nullius, such a claim is  o f dubio us  merit to day, if o nly fo r the reaso n that it harkens  back to  the
time when imperialis t co untries  divided up the wo rld at their will. It has  in so me cases , no tably Aus tralia, has  been judicially
o verruled at the highes t co urt level.57 It s tretches  credulity to day to  argue that the Japanese annexatio n was  jus tif ied o n the terra
nullius  principle and was  therefo re unrelated to  the victo ry it had jus t seized o ver China in war and mo re bro adly to  the military and
diplo matic advantage Japan enjo yed in the co ntext o f its  rise and China’s  decline as  the wave o f high imperialism washed acro ss
Eas t As ia. Fro m China’s  viewpo int, a s ingle line may be drawn fro m Ryukyu (1879), Senkaku (1895), Taiwan (1895), to  Do ngbei o r
“Manchuria” (1931). The People’s Daily in May 2013 drew precisely such a line.
The prefix “koyu no ryodo” (“intrins ic” o r “inalienable” natio nal territo ry), attaches  no w almo s t inevitably to  any reference to  “Senkaku
Is lands ,” implying at leas t that they had lo ng been “part” o f the Ryukyu is lands . Yet that is  a dubio us  pro po s itio n s ince they were no t
part o f Ryukyu’s  “36  is lands” in pre-mo dern times  no r when the prefecture was  es tablished in 1879, but were tacked o n to  it 16
years  later. It is  also  an iro nic appellatio n fo r is lands  unkno wn in Japan till the late 19 th century, then identified fro m British naval
references , no t declared Japanese till 1895 o r named until 1900 , fo r which neither name no r Japanese claim was  revealed until 1952.
Furthermo re, what were annexed in 1895 were two  is lands , Uo tsuri and Kuba. Two  o thers  were added in the leaseho ld arrangements
es tablished in 1896, and o ne mo re in 1921. When the Go vernment o f Japan “natio nalized” the “Senkakus” in 2012, it acted in
relatio n o nly to  the three o f them no minally in private hands . Two  were excluded, including o ne that s till remains  in private hands .
They are co mmo nly kno wn, even to  the Japanese Co as tguard, by their Chinese names , Huangwei and Chiwei, rather than their
Japanese names , Kuba and Taisho , and have remained under unco ntes ted US co ntro l – as  a bombing range – s ince 1955 fo r Kuba and
1956  fo r Taisho  with neither natio nal no r metro po litan go vernment in Japan ever co mplaining o r seeking their return. Respo nding o n
behalf o f the go vernment in 2010  to  a Diet ques tio n as  to  why no  effo rt had been made to  reco ver the is lands , a spo kesman said
that the US s ide “had no t indicated its  intentio n to  return them.” 58  In o ther wo rds , Japan wo uld no t dream o f seeking their return
unless  the US firs t indicated that it wo uld be permiss ible to  do  so .
It means  that, ho wever o utspo ken and bo ld they may be to  address  China, and ho wever adamant o n Japan’s  “inherent” o wnership
rights , co urage deserts  Japan’s  leaders  when facing the United States . Lo ng-term US military o ccupatio ns  o f what they claimed to  be
“intrins ic” territo ry s imply do  no t matter. Whatever “koyu” means , it is  no t inco ns is tent with o ccupancy by ano ther co untry, even if
that o ther co untry sho uld cho o se to  bo mb such is lands  to  smithereens , so  lo ng as  that “o ther co untry” is  the United States .
The wo rd “koyu” (Chinese: “guyou”) has  no  precise English trans latio n and the co ncept is  unkno wn in internatio nal law and fo reign to
dis co urse o n natio nal territo ry in much, if no t mo s t, o f the wo rld.59  The co ncept seems  to  have been invented in Japan aro und 1970,
alo ng with the term Hoppo Ryodo (No rthern Territo ries ) as  part o f the effo rt to  reinfo rce linguis tically Japan’s  claim to  what had been
kno wn as  the So uthern Kurile Is lands .6 0  It was  subsequently ado pted to  underline the Japanese claim to  Takeshima (Do kdo )
agains t So uth Ko rea, and then to  the Senkaku is lands  (agains t China and Taiwan). Ho wever, in due co urse Japan’s  rheto rical device
to  make its  o wn case seem beyo nd dispute was  ado pted by all parties  (including China and Ko rea), making the claims  abso lute and
unnego tiable, and thereby o bscuring o ne o f the lesso ns  o f mo dern wo rld his to ry: that bo rders  are rarely abso lute o r sacro sanct, as
sho wn by the example o f Germany sacrif icing mo s t o f its  Pruss ian heartland in 1945 but then emerging, reinfo rced, at the centre o f
Euro pe.
Furthermo re, being a rheto rical rather than scientif ic term, the wo rd “koyu” who se linguis tic sense is  “intrins ic” o r “unequivo cal,” in
practice has  been given an o ppo s ite meaning, territo ries  that tended to  be marginal and inferior, susceptible o f being abando ned o r
traded away by the “mainland” if the interes ts  o f the “koyu hondo” ( intrins ic mainland) co re require it.6 1 Thus , Japan’s  readiness
(mentio ned abo ve) to  trade the Miyako  and Yaeyama is land gro ups  in 1880  as  part o f a fro ntier grand bargain. Likewise, to o , when
facing a survival cris is  in the summer o f 1945 the Japanese miss io n to  sue fo r peace headed by Ko no e Fumimaro  (three times
fo rmer Prime Minis ter), carried ins tructio ns  is suing fro m the empero r himself to  ensure the “preservatio n o f the natio nal po lity”
(i.e., the empero r-centred sys tem), in which it was  taken fo r granted that Japan wo uld no t o nly lo se all its  co lo nies  but be reduced
to  “abando ning Okinawa, Ogasawara and Karafuto  (Sakhalin) and having to  be satis fied with a “koyu hondo” co ns is ting jus t o f the
fo ur is lands  o f Ho nshu, Shiko ku, Ho kkaido  and Kyushu.”6 2
The Miyako  and the Yaeyama Is lands  co uld be traded away in 1880, and Okinawa itself co uld be sacrif iced to  pro tect the interes ts  o f
“Japan pro per” and save the natio nal po lity in 1945, sho wed that fro ntier territo ries , whether o r no t graced with the title o f
“intrins ic,” in fact ranked lo w in natio nal po licy. No where ranked lo wer than Senkaku, the periphery o f Japan’s  periphery.
As  to  the seco nd, there is  a dis ingenuo us  quality to  the Japanese po s itio n that China’s  s ilence o n the Japanese o ccupatio n o f the
is lands  until 1970  co uld be co ns trued as  co nsent. Internatio nal law o ffered no  sys tem to  which aggrieved co lo nial o r semi-co lo nial
co untries  co uld appeal and no  such reco urse was  o pen to  China - whether the Republic (who se capital mo ved fro m Nanjing to  Taiwan
in 1949) o r the Peo ple’s  Republic (fro m 1949) - until the time it was  actually sho wn, when the withdrawal o f US fo rces  fro m Okinawa
became imminent and fo cussed attentio n o n what was  and what was  no t “Okinawa” and to  who m it sho uld be “returned.” No rmalcy”
with Japan was  no t acco mplished fo r China until 1972, which also  happened to  be the year that the US returned adminis trative
autho rity o ver the Senkakus  to  Japan. Fro m then, the Chinese pro tes t was  plain.
 
6. China’s claim
The Chinese claim (Peo ple’s  Republic and Republic alike) to  Diao yu res ts  o n his to ry (the reco rds  o f the Ming and Qing dynas ties )
and geo graphy (the co ntinental shelf and the deep gulf that sets  the Senkaku/Diao yu is lands  apart fro m the Ryukyu is land chain).
Fo r bo th, the is lands  are an integral part o f Taiwan’s  territo ry and the fact that they were appro priated by Japan as  part o f the vio lent
pro cesses  o f the Sino -Japanese War, and sho uld therefo re have been returned to  China under the Po tsdam Agreement, is  plain.
There are two  further, increas ingly impo rtant angles , ro o ted in co ntempo rary geo -po litics . One is  the inequity in the hand China is
bequeathed by its  fo rbears  because they did no t es tablish a chain o f is land co lo nial and dependent territo ries  like the o ther po wers
o f the early mo dern and mo dern wo rld and fo r that reaso n China gains  virtually no thing fro m the huge dis tributio n o f glo bal marine
reso urces  carried o ut under the 1982 United Natio ns  Co nventio n o n the Law o f the Sea (UNCLOS) while the fo rmer co lo nial po wers
have been richly rewarded.
While glo bal attentio n co ncentrates  o n the suppo sed grab fo r o cean and reso urces  being carried o ut by China in the Eas t and So uth
China Seas , the far greater claims  by the club o f advanced co untries , mo s tly fo rmer imperialis t and co lo nial po wers , have fo r the
mo s t part escaped attentio n. The great beneficiaries  have been the US, UK, France, to gether with Aus tralia, New Zealand and Russ ia,
fo llo wed clo sely by Japan,6 3 who se claims  as  a maritime great po wer, with o r witho ut Senkaku/Diao yu, gro w rapidly in s ignificance.
Dis co veries  o f methane hydrates , rare earths , and precio us  and indus trial metals  in s ignificant quantities  in its  vario us  o cean
do mains  (including claimed but co ntes ted o nes  o ther than Senkaku/Diao yu) make it a po tential maritime superpo wer.6 4 In terms  o f
o cean do mains  Japan ranks  at No  9 , co ntro lling five times  as  great an o cean area as  China, while China, at No . 31, ranks  jus t
between The Maldives  and So malia.6 5 China “played no  part in the 19 th and 20 th century pro cesses  o f dividing up the Pacific land
territo ries  and plays  no ne no w in dividing up its  o cean.”6 6  The very fact that China is  such a mino r player in glo bal terms  in its  claims
o n wo rld o ceans  might reinfo rce its  determinatio n no t to  yield in the spaces , such as  Senkaku/Diao yu, where it do es  have a claim.
As  Peter No lan no tes  (his  reference here to  So uth China Sea may be extended to  Eas t China Sea),
“The Wes t’s  preo ccupatio n with Beijing’s  invo lvement in the So uth China Sea co ntras ts  sharply with the co mplete absence o f
dis cuss io n o f the Wes t’s  vas t exclus ive eco no mic zo nes  in the regio n. The fo rmer imperial po wers ’ acquis itio n o f co ntro l o ver vas t
marine territo ries  and reso urces  thro ugh UNCLOS has  received negligible attentio n o ther than in specialis t legal jo urnals , yet it
eclipses  by so me dis tance the area and reso urces  that are in co ntentio n in the So uth China Sea.”6 7
Furthermo re, the Chinese des ire fo r “no rmalcy” as  a glo bal po wer, able to  pro ject its  naval weight and to  pro tect its  maritime
interes ts  in the same way o ther po wers  take fo r granted, is  serio us ly disadvantaged by lack o f any undisputed access  to  the Pacific
Ocean. Fro m its  perspective, the gateways  to  the Pacific lie in the no rth thro ugh the So ya Strait between Sakhalin and Ho kkaido ,
Tsugaru Strait between Ho kkaido  and Ho nshu, and in the so uth thro ugh the Osumi Strait between Kago shima and Tanegashima o r
the Miyako  Strait between Okinawa (main) Is land and Miyako  Is land. Further so uth lies  the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the
Philippines . Japan resents  the Chinese Navy’s  passage thro ugh such passages , no tably the Osumi and Miyako  Straits , but fro m the
Chinese viewpo int, the lo ng chain o f Japanese co ntro lled is lands  lo o ks  like no thing so  much as  a maritime great wall, and the
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“What  is called fo r is t he co urage t o  declare
t hat  Japan’s islands are Japan’s t errit o ry”)
mo ves  to  militarize the secto rs  till no w neglected (especially between
Okinawa Is land and Taiwan) s tir ris ing Chinese co ncern.
The spectrum o f thinking in Chinese so ciety may be much less  mo no lithic
than co mmo nly assumed. Altho ugh anti-Japan sentiment in China is
undo ubtedly subject to  so me manipulatio n by go vernment, dis trus t o f
Japan res ts  o n an accumulatio n o f unreso lved grievances  fro m the mo re
than a century o f mo dern his to ry, and it is  likely to  be even s tro nger at
the po pular than at the go vernment level.6 8
In general, China and Taiwan are united in their s tance o n
Senkaku/Diao yu matters , but it is  to  be no ted that a Japan-Taiwan
fisheries  agreement was  co ncluded in 2013 (after 17 years  o f talks )
under which Taiwanese fishermen wo uld have right to  fish in certain
specified waters  adjacent to  Senkaku/Diao yu, if no t in near co as tal
waters . It may be seen as  a smart Japanese diplo matic ges ture to  split
Beijing and Taipei, and thus  to  ease the pressure fro m ho s tile
co nfro ntatio n o n all its  fro ntiers . It presumably mans  that the Taiwan
co as tguard will no  lo nger co nfro nt Japanese fo rces  with ho s tile intent.
The deal made no  reference to  territo rial is sues  but Beijing o bjected, and
whether it will ho ld remains  to  be seen.6 9
Kyo to  Univers ity’s  Ino ue Kiyo shi made the po int fo rty years  ago  that,
“Even tho ugh the [Senkaku] is lands  were no t wres ted fro m China under a
treaty, they were grabbed fro m it by s tealth, witho ut treaty o r
nego tiatio ns , taking advantage o f victo ry in war.” 70  It is  a judgement
co nfirmed in 2012 fro m the o ppo s ite end o f the ideo lo gical spectrum by
The Economist, which wro te: “Whatever the legality o f Japan’s  claim to  the
is lands , its  ro o ts  lie in brutal empire-building.” 71
7. T he Okinawan Perspect ive
Okinawans  are aware in the depths  o f their bo nes  that co ntes t o ver
so vereignty, in their regio nal waters , threatens  them. The mo re the
natio nal security agenda as  defined in To kyo  and Washingto n advances ,
the mo re insecure they beco me. War fo r the defence o f Senkaku wo uld
be a “re-run o f the battle o f the Seco nd Wo rld war, with us , Okinawans ,
the victims ,” as  Hiyane Teruo  o f the Univers ity o f the Ryukyus  puts  it.72
Okinawan Senkaku thinking is  characterized by five things : the claim o f a
lo ng and clo se co nnectio n; the agency o f civil so ciety rather than
go vernment; the o rientatio n to wards  an inclus ive and regio nal co o perative rather than exclus ive so lutio n; the o ppo s itio n to
militarizatio n (Okinawans  in 1945 learned the bitter lesso n that armies  do  no t defend peo ple, and are therefo re dis inclined to
believe in any defence o f the Senkaku that res ts  o n militariz ing them and embedding them in ho s tile co nfro ntatio n with China); and
(by co ntras t with the res t o f Japan) a lo ng his to rical memo ry o f friendly relatio ns  with China.
So me no w talk o f an Okinawa-centred “liveliho o d zo ne” o r (a pro po sal o riginating in Taiwan) o f a “Minjian Eas t As ia Fo rum.”
Pro po nents  o f such agendas  avo id the language o f “inherent territo ry” o r exclus ive claims  to  o il o r gas  reso urces , prefer ins tead to
talk o f co mmunity, o pen bo rders  and prio rity to  the lo cal o ver the natio n s tate. Fo r them, “liveliho o d zo ne” replaces  “koyu no ryodo.”
Naturally, they o ppo se military interventio ns  and fo rce-based po s itio ns . They are the antithes is  o f the To kyo -centred “inherent”
(natio nal) territo ry. They believe the fo cus  o n “so vereignty” has  to  be widened to  o pen a perspective o f “spheres  o f bo rder
interactio n,” “subs tantive spheres  fo r neighbo uring co untries ,” and a No rtheas t As ian “demilitarized zo ne.”73
The challenge is  especially critical fo r Okinawa because it has  fo cussed so  much o f its  so cial energy o ver decades  o n the s truggle
agains t a militarizatio n and base dependence, which the Japanese s tate and mainland media jus tify by reference to  “China threat.”
The Japanese natio nal bureaucracy in To kyo  and its  American patro ns  who  pursue the agenda o f Okinawan base reinfo rcement as
part o f military co nfro ntatio n with China naturally ho pe that a sense o f threatened “natio nal” interes t wo uld serve to  so ften
Okinawan o ppo s itio n to  the base agenda. The ado ptio n o f unanimo us  reso lutio ns  by the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and the
City Assemblies  o f Miyako  and Ishigaki (geo graphically clo ses t to  Senkaku) affirming that the Senkaku is lands  did indeed “belo ng
to  Japan” and calling fo r Japan to  be reso lute (kizentaru) in defending them indicted that that “natio nal security” co ns ideratio ns  were
indeed beco ming impo rtant co ns ideratio ns  in Okinawan base po litics . When the People’s Daily in May 2013 sugges ted Okinawa’s
s tatus  needed to  be re-nego tiated, the Okinawan peo ple’s  mo vement saw it as  a blo w, fearing that, whatever the Chinese intent, any
such campaign wo uld be bo und to  weaken their mo vement.74
8. Co nclusio n
Where the Japanese case fo r exclus ive entitlement to  the Senkaku/Diao yu Is lands  is  s tro ng o n a s trict reading o f internatio nal law,
China’s  is  s tro ng o n gro unds  o f his to ry and geo graphy. Its  ins is tence that the frame fo r thinking o f the pro blem include no t jus t an
antiseptic “internatio nal law” but the reco rd o f co lo nialism, imperialism, and war also  has  a mo ral quality.
There are no  tribunals  to  adjudicate o n such co nflicting claims  and, despite the assumptio n that there has  to  be a “right” answer,
internatio nal law is  no  set o f abs tract and transcendent principles  but an evo lving express io n o f glo bal po wer relatio ns , reflecting at
any o ne time the interes ts  o f do minant glo bal po wers .75 No ne o f the s tate parties  (Japan, China, Taiwan) is  likely to  submit to  any
fo rmula that ho lds  the po ss ibility o f a zero  o utco me. So , even tho ugh there are no  res idents  o f these is lands  with rights  to  be
pro tected and in that sense reso lutio n sho uld no t be so  diff icult, and despite the large eco no mic interes ts  shared by China and
Japan, reco urse to  internatio nal law arbitratio n is  highly unlikely.
Fo rty-five years  after ECAFE’s  repo rt that raised the pro spect o f an o il and gas  bo nanza, no  reso urce has  been co nfirmed. The
surro unding waters  may o r may no t be rich in hydro carbo ns  but, even if they are, fo r o ne party to  explo it them in the face o f ho s tility
o f the o ther wo uld be risky in the extreme. And if, fo r example Japan were to  success fully to  extract so me reso urce, to  attempt then
to  transpo rt it acro ss  the Ryukyu Trench to  Japanese markets  wo uld also  be fo rbiddingly diff icult and expens ive, rather like
transpo rting Middle Eas tern o il o ver the Himalayas  to  Japan, while transpo rt fro m the edge o f the co ntinental shelf to  markets  in
eas tern China o n the o ther hand wo uld present little pro blem.76  Quite apart fro m po litical co ns ideratio ns , the immense technical
difficulty and risk invo lved therefo re makes  the co o peratio n o f multiple go vernments  and financial gro ups  highly des irable.
Fo r Japan, Senkaku/Diao yu beco mes  a key element in the definitio n o f a ro le in the regio n and the wo rld: a regio nal s tate
co ncentrating o n building a co o perative o rder o r a US client s tate co o perating in building a s tructure o f co ntainment o f China, even
while fearful the US might o ne day shift its  As ian co re interes t fro m Japan to  China – the trauma o f the Nixo n sho cks  remaining deep
in the Japanese co nscio usness . The US “Client State” is  bo ld to wards  China and craven to wards  the United States . To  be able to  set
as ide the deceptio n and so phis try o ver “inherent” territo ry and absence o f dispute that has  been allo wed to  swallo w ratio nal
dis cuss io n o f the Senkaku/Diao yu is sue wo uld require no thing sho rt o f a “spiritual revo lutio n.”77
The electio n in Japan late in 2012 o f a go vernment o f “Shinto ” believers  in the uniqueness  o f empero r-centred Japan who  were
denialis ts  o f Nanjing and “Co mfo rt Wo men” and pro po nents  o f a s tro nger Japan, with a fresh co ns titutio n to  warrant greater military
build-up, co uld s carcely fail to  ring alarm bells  in China, and fo r that matter thro ugho ut As ia.78  It also  caused co ncern in
Washingto n, as  the Co ngress io nal Research Service in May spelled o ut.
Three general po ints  may be made.
Firs t, it is  hard to  imagine any advance o n the current, increas ingly militarized co nfro ntatio n o ver Senkaku/Diao yu unless  and until
Japan co ncedes  that there is  a dispute. The lo nger it res is ts  do ing so , the greater the lo ss  o f face it s tands  to  suffer when
eventually, likely under US pressure, it f inds  that it has  to .
Seco nd, the is sue is  no t s imply territo rial but deeply ro o ted in his to ry. Japanese tend to  fo rget; Chinese are unable to  fo rget. The
“Senkaku” is sue to day carries  a “blo wback” quality o f unassuaged Chinese suspicio n o ver Japan’s  lo ng neglected o r insufficiently
reso lved war respo ns ibility, the high-level denials  o f Nanjing, the perio dic right-wing attempts  to  sanitize his to ry texts , the refusal
to  accept fo rmal legal respo ns ibility fo r the victims  o f the As ia-wide “Co mfo rt Wo men” s lavery sys tem, the perio dic vis its  by Prime
Minis ters  (no tably Ko izumi, 2001-2006) and Diet Members  to  Yasukuni.79  In April 2013, Deputy PM Aso  and 168  members  o f the
Lo wer Ho use participated in he spring rites  at Yasukuni.
Third, Japanese elites  and the mass  media alike seem to  have lo s t the capacity to  appreciate the Chinese po s itio n o r to  achieve a
self-critical awareness  o f their o wn. While pro jecting a picture o f China as  threatening and “o ther,” they pay minimal attentio n either
to  the circumstances  surro unding the Chinese claim to  the is lands  o r to  the reaso ns  fo r the general suspicio n o f Japan. They take
fo r granted that Japan “o wns” the is lands  and blame it fo r the cris is  o ver them, and they have no  sense o f respo ns ibility fo r the
trashing o f the “freeze” agreements  o f 1972 and 1978  (who se exis tence, fo r the mo s t part, they s imply deny).8 0  Japan’s  claim is
rheto rical, ambiguo us , manipulative, and ho s tile to  co mpro mise o r nego tiatio n, yet few do ubt that the Japanese po s itio n is
“fundamentally so lid and quite tenable under exis ting internatio nal law.”8 1
Ho wever superficially intractable, ho wever, the kind o f regio nal, Eas t China Sea way fo rward, alluded to  earlier by Fukuda Yasuo , Hu
Jintao , Hato yama Yukio , and o thers , need no t be so  diff icult and indeed co uld be fairly s traightfo rward, at leas t in principle. Since
the pro spect o f a reso lutio n to  the so vereignty ques tio n is  minimal, bes t, therefo re, to  set it as ide, to  revert in effect to  the
“shelving” agreement o f 1972-2010  but to  co mbine that with active co o peratio n aro und and perhaps  under the is lands . Agreements
fo r sharing reso urces , sharing respo ns ibility fo r the pro tectio n o f nature (with po ss ible UN Wo rld Heritage s tatus ), and fo r shared
po licing and adminis tratio n o f the is lands  and their seas  co uld be nego tiated. Co o perative arrangements  fo r fisheries  and reso urce
extractio n had been put in place in parts  o f this  sea befo re the cris is  that erupted in 2010  fro ze mo s t o f its  mechanisms , and co uld
be reins tated and expanded. China scho lar Yabuki makes  a s imple, radical pro po sal,
“Fo r ins tance, there co uld be a ‘o ne is land, two  go vernments ’ respo nse to  ‘Senkaku-Diao yu,’ wherein Japan might adminis ter the
is lands  o n o dd days  and China o n even days . What is  required is  the creatio n o f this  type o f a ‘new co nsensus ’ based o n shared
adminis tratio n, the maintenance o f peace and o rder, and fair sharing o f reso urces .”8 2
It is  a fo rmula unlikely to  reco mmend itself to  either s ide at this  mo ment, but it, o r so mething like it, may in fact be the o nly
realis tic way fo rward. Only such a perspective, relativiz ing the natio n s tate and building a s tructure o f co o peratio n aro und and
acro ss  natio nal bo rders , o ffers  a pro spect o f reso lving the Senkaku/Diao yu pro blem, transcending the San Francis co  sys tem and
s ignalling the birth o f a Pax Asia.
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